Engineering demonstration

Autonomous AI repair system for open-source projects.

It localizes a reported bug, writes a patch and a regression test, and must clear two independent reviews and 16 fail-closed release gates before it can ship without a human in the loop.
11PRs merged
1fully autonomous
16fail-closed gates
6/6bad ships blocked

Explore the demo ↓

caddyserver/caddy 5 PRs Merged
rclone/rclone 3 PRs Merged
ethereum/go-ethereum 1 PR Merged
k3s-io/k3s 1 PR Merged
esengine/DeepSeek-Reasonix issue → merged, untouched by human hands
Fully autonomous
Live Demonstration recorded session, deterministic replay — reproduce it: make demo

Tests FAIL on buggy code

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Tests PASS on patch

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✓ All 16 gates passed — SHIP PERMITTED
A seeded Go bug through the real pipeline modules. Model stages replay a captured 2026-10-21 session; tests and gates execute deterministically. Nothing runs on this site.
Production record

Merged pull requests

Every link is the public record on GitHub.

RepositoryPRChangeStatusMerged
caddyserver/caddy#7898Register nested named-route invokes transitivelyMerged2026-07-30
caddyserver/caddy#7905Flush headers immediately for SSE responsesMerged2026-07-31
caddyserver/caddy#7904Isolate auth-provider responsesMerged2026-08-01
rclone/rclone#9639serve nfs: fix EIO creating symlinksMerged2026-08-01
caddyserver/caddy#7916Isolate health-check state per check configMerged2026-08-12
caddyserver/caddy#7920Shield hostnames from wildcard client authMerged2026-08-12
ethereum/go-ethereum#35433Synthesize finalized markers only with explicit sync targetMerged2026-08-12
rclone/rclone#9726drive: pool resumable-upload chunk buffersMerged2026-08-30
rclone/rclone#9847onedrive: manual drive-ID fallbackMerged2026-09-01
k3s-io/k3s#14552Restore Flatcar detection in install scriptMerged2026-09-03
esengine/DeepSeek-Reasonix#9707Merge live proxy-observed MCP tools into catalogMerged Autonomous2026-09-25
Real upstream work Production repositories, real maintainer review — not a benchmark sandbox.
Fail-closed security Model output is a proposal; 16 deterministic gates hold ship authority. UNKNOWN is never PASS.
Fully reproducible Open lab, sha-verified production modules, one-command demo on your machine.
Honest measurement Pre-registered bars, published NO-GO verdicts, limitations stated plainly.
Under the hood

Full technical details

Pipeline architecture
  • Localize — a read-only model session names the faulty files from the issue text alone (88–93% top-1 on 37 ground-truth issues; keyword baseline 11%).
  • Patch — a bounded session (file tools, no shell) edits the checkout; only the diff is kept.
  • Regression test — a fix-blind session writes a test that must FAIL on base and PASS on patch, twice, stably.
  • Judge ×2 — independent review passes; the second reads neutralized issue text so steering produces a divergence.
  • 16 release gates — budgets, capacity, policy, scope, lints, breaker; a gate that errors fails closed.
Correct fix vs wrong fix, side by side

The model's fix → shipped

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A plausible wrong fix → blocked

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Full pipeline log (unabridged)
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Verification suite
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Real-world reproduction: go-ethereum #34692

The seeded demo bug is synthetic by design. The same localization session, pointed at go-ethereum before the maintainers fixed issue #34692, named node/rpcstack.go top-1 in 9.6 s — matching the merged fix. One benchmark data point; localization only; live runs vary.

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Numbers & limitations
  • Localization: 88–93% top-1 (100% top-3) on 37 issues with merged human fixes.
  • Fixes: validated against merged human fixes pre-launch; 4/5 decisive runs passed the maintainers' own tests.
  • Honest negatives: a Rust expansion closed NO-PROMOTE on pre-registered bars, twice; one PR withdrawn as a design finding.
  • The seeded demo bug is easier than production work; recorded output is recorded; live sessions vary.
  • A merged PR proves a change passed one repository's review — nothing more universal.
  • Reproduction tested on macOS/arm64 (go 1.25, python 3.14); Linux expected, unverified.
Security model & failure injection

Reasoning does not confer authority. Model and external text are untrusted inputs to a deterministic control plane. Six injected failures, six blocks (the demo's third tab, or make inject):

  • Plausible-but-wrong patch → tests catch it; tests_pass refuses.
  • Prompt-injection in the issue text → injection_lint refuses.
  • Diff touching CI config → content_lint refuses.
  • Oversized 40-file diff → size_caps refuses.
  • Tripped circuit breaker → breaker_armed refuses.
  • Missing state file → the gate errors and fails closed.

This site is static files only — no backend, no analytics, no cookies; nothing here can execute code or spend a model budget.

Reproduce it & raw artifacts
git clone https://github.com/SillyZir/agent-omega-lab cd agent-omega-lab make demo # full pipeline, ~1 min, no API key needed make inject # six blocked-failure scenarios make verify # machine-checkable assertions

MANIFEST.json proves by sha256 that the modules doing the work are byte-identical to the published production code; tools/record.py regenerates every recording under your own account. Artifacts: the model's patch · generated regression test · the wrong patch · judge verdicts (fix) · judge verdicts (wrong patch) · regression-test record · the seeded issue · recording transcript